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Abstract 
Mechanisms of Positive and Minimizing Reappraisal 
Bruce P. Doré 
The ability to find positive meaning and in turn generate positive emotions in the 
face of negative life circumstances is a protective factor against the harmful 
effects of stress, and a critical pathway to resilience and growth. Despite its clear 
importance, little is known about the brain mechanisms that support this ability, 
the processes that underlie decisions to implement it, or the long-term effects it 
has on memories of negative life experiences. Study 1 shows that finding positive 
meaning in negative experiences engages the brain’s system for reward 
valuation, whereas minimizing negative emotions dampens activity in a region 
involved in generating emotional arousal. Study 2 shows that spontaneous brain 
responses to aversive stimuli can be used to prospectively predict decisions to 
regulate emotion, and the predictive value of these responses is comparable 
across finding positive meaning and minimizing negative emotions. Study 3 
shows that finding positive meaning and minimizing negative feelings can bring 
about distinct lasting effects on the content and affective impact of memories of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Distressing life events are an unavoidable aspect of human experience, 
and many areas of research converge to demonstrate that how we respond to 
these events matters for our long-term mental and physical well-being (see 
Bonnano, 2004; Folkman, 2008; Gross, 2015; Russo et al., 2012). Beyond simply 
dampening negative reactions to stressors, the ability to find positive meaning in 
potentially traumatic circumstances has been consistently identified as a 
protective factor against the harmful effects of stress, and a critical pathway to 
resilience – the maintenance or enhancement of function in the face of potential 
trauma.  
Focusing on the positive implications of a distressing experience can be 
understood as an instance of reappraisal, a strategy for emotion regulation 
that entails reframing the meaning of an emotional situation. Laboratory 
research has typically considered reappraisal as a uniform strategy, ignoring 
differences between different ways of reappraising that may act as crucial 
sources of variability in emotion regulation success (see Doré, Silvers, & 
Ochsner, 2016). In particular, a fundamental distinction can be made between 
minimizing reappraisal, which entails focusing on unemotional aspects of a 
negative experience to dampen negative feelings, and positive reappraisal, 
which entails focusing on positive aspects of a negative experience to enhance 
positive feelings (see McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012; McRae & Mauss, 2015). 
Despite its clear importance, little is known about the mechanisms that 





processes that prompt decisions to do so, or the long-term effects of this strategy 
on memories of aversive experiences. The studies described below ask the 
following questions about these mechanisms: 
 
Study 1: What brain mechanisms underlie successful positive reappraisal, 
and how do these differ from the brain mechanisms underlying successful 
minimizing reappraisal?  
Study 2: Can spontaneous brain responses to aversive stimuli be used to 
prospectively predict decisions to regulate emotion? Does the predictive 
value of these responses differ across positive versus minimizing 
reappraisal?  
Study 3: Can reappraisal exert lasting effects on the content and affective 
impact of memories of negative experiences? Do these effects differ 














Chapter 2: Finding positive meaning in negative experiences engages 
ventral striatal and ventromedial prefrontal regions associated with reward 
valuation 
Introduction 
Distressing life events are an unavoidable aspect of human experience. 
Many areas of research converge to demonstrate that how we respond to these 
events matters for our long-term mental and physical well-being (Gross, 2015; 
Folkman, 2008; Bonnano, 2004).  Beyond simply dampening negative reactions 
to stressors, the ability to find positive meaning in potentially traumatic 
circumstances has been consistently identified as a protective factor against the 
harmful effects of stress, and a critical pathway to resilience – the maintenance 
or enhancement of function in the face of potential trauma (Russo et al., 2012; 
Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Helgelson et al., 2006).  For example, behavioral 
studies show that expressing positive emotion when speaking about a recent 
bereavement predicts improved psychological functioning over several years 
(Bonnano & Keltner, 1997) and finding benefits or life lessons in experiencing a 
heart attack predicts improvement in health and decreased risk for a subsequent 
attack (Affleck et al., 1987). 
Despite its clear importance, virtually nothing is known about the neural 
mechanisms that underlie the ability to find positive meaning, and in turn 
generate positive emotion, in the face of adversity. Addressing this gap in the 





emotional capabilities and helps clarify the precise brain processes that may fail 
in psychopathology (Kring & Sloan, 2009).  
Focusing on the positive implications of a distressing experience can be 
understood as an instance of reappraisal, a strategy for emotion regulation that 
entails reframing the meaning of an emotional situation. Laboratory research has 
typically considered reappraisal as a uniform strategy, ignoring potentially crucial 
differences between different ways of reappraising (Ochsner et al., 2012; Buhle 
et al., 2014). In particular, a fundamental distinction can be made between 
minimizing reappraisal, which entails focusing on unemotional aspects of a 
negative experience to dampen negative feelings, and positive reappraisal, which 
entails focusing on positive aspects of a negative experience to enhance positive 
feelings (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012; McRae & Mauss, 2015).  
Prior neuroimaging studies indicate that reappraisal of negative stimuli 
elicits increased activity in brain regions associated with domain-general 
cognitive control, including ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and lateral 
parietal cortex, alongside decreased activity in brain regions associated with 
emotional responding, including the amygdala (Buhle et al., 2014). However, 
converging lines of evidence suggest that positive reappraisal may engage 
distinct neural systems.  
First, although early theories of amygdala function associated this region 
with negative emotions like fear (LeDoux, 1998), more recent work has shown 





goals, including stimuli that are positive, arousing, novel, ambiguous, or 
surprising (Whalen, 1998; Cunningham & Brosch, 2012). Second, behavioral and 
psychophysiological studies have observed that, unlike minimizing reappraisal, 
positive reappraisal does not diminish arousal elicited by negative stimuli, but 
instead changes the emotional valence of this arousal from negative to positive 
(McRae et al., 2012; Shiota & Levenson, 2012). Third, neuroscience research 
has characterized a system of brain regions, including the ventral striatum (which 
includes nucleus accumbens) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that 
are involved in computing reward value and thought to underlie positive 
emotional responding across a wide variety of contexts (Bartra et al., 2013; 
Haber & Knutson, 2010; Sabatinelli et al., 2007; Mobbs et al., 2003). 
To the extent that positive reappraisal successfully elicits positive emotion, 
it should not modulate the amygdala, but rather the ventral striatum and vmPFC 
regions associated with reward. Moreover, vmPFC and amygdala are 
reciprocally interconnected via dense white matter projections (Freese & Amaral, 
2009), and have been observed to show both negative (Johnstone et al., 2007) 
and positive patterns of coactivation (Erk et al., 2010; Banks et al., 2007) during 
emotion regulation. However, it is not yet clear what this coactivation reflects. 
Following theories of vmPFC as a region computing an integrative and 
contextually-sensitive signal for positive value (Rangel & Hare, 2010; Roy et al., 
2012), it may be that positive connectivity between amygdala and vmPFC 





affective arousal from negative to positive. If so, vmPFC should show enhanced 
positive connectivity with the amygdala during positive reappraisal. 
Taken together, these separate lines of work suggest that positive 
reappraisal and minimizing reappraisal may show similarities in engagement of 
control-related prefrontal and parietal regions, but differences in the extent to 
which they modulate brain regions associated with affective arousal and positive 
value as well as the extent to which they rely on vmPFC to amygdala 
connectivity.  
We used behavioral and fMRI methods to address these questions. In a 
preliminary behavioral analysis, we used affect ratings made in the fMRI scanner 
and text data we collected in a separate cohort of participants to examine the 
effects of these experimental conditions on emotional experience and the 
linguistic content of each type of reappraisal. In our neuroimaging study, we 
tested four hypotheses about the neural mechanisms of positive versus 
minimizing reappraisals. First, we hypothesized that positive and minimizing 
reappraisal would engage common regions of prefrontal and parietal cortex. 
Second, we hypothesized that positive reappraisal would modulate activity in the 
amygdala to a lesser extent than minimizing reappraisal. Third, we hypothesized 
that positive reappraisal would modulate activity in the ventral striatum and 
vmPFC to a greater extent than minimizing reappraisal. Finally, we hypothesized 
that successful positive reappraisal would rely on enhanced connectivity between 







Participants were 20 adults (12F, 8M) recruited from the New York City 
area (mean age = 24.6, SD=4.5), and screened to confirm that they could read 
and speak fluently in English, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, had 
never been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder, did not report current 
depressive symptoms (i.e. scored below 16 on the Center for Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression scale), and had no conditions that contraindicated magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI). A separate cohort of 20 adults (11F, 9M; mean age = 
21.5, SD=3.1) completed a behavioral study in which they typed texts 
representing the content of their reappraisals and natural responses. All study 
procedures were approved by the Columbia IRB.  
 
Figure 2.1 Trial sequence for fMRI instructed reappraisal task in Study 1. 
 
Image acquisition 
Data were collected with a 3T GE MR750 magnet and a 32-channel RF 
head coil. Structural volumes were acquired using a high-resolution T1-weighted 
sagittal 3D BRAVO sequence yielding 1mm3 isotropic voxel size. Functional 





sequence with a repetition time (TR) of 2000ms, an echo time (TE) of 25ms, a 
77° flip angle, and a 19.2cm FOV consisting of 45 interleaved 3mm slices 
acquired parallel to the ACPC axis. Four runs of 185 TRs were collected. Each 
run began with 8s of fixation and the corresponding four volumes were 
discarded. 
Task design 
Participants completed an experimental task consisting of six functional 
runs. One half (three consecutive runs) of the experimental task was devoted to 
positive reappraisal (with positive reappraisal trials, negative image trials and 
neutral image trials intermixed), and the other half (three consecutive runs) was 
devoted to minimizing reappraisal (with minimizing reappraisal trials, negative 
image trials, and neutral image trials intermixed). The order of positive and 
minimizing reappraisal was counterbalanced across participants. Each run 
consisted of 15 trials each: five negative image reappraisal trials, five negative 
image natural response trials, and five neutral image trials. The trial sequence, 
consisting of cue, image, inter-stimulus interval (ISI), rating period 
(counterbalanced order), and inter-trial interval (ITI), is represented in Figure 2.1. 
Aversive images (mean valence=2.49; mean arousal=5.71) and neutral images 
(mean valence=5.41; mean arousal=3.54) were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 1993). Aversive images were 
counterbalanced to experimental condition across participants. Before scanning, 
participants completed experimenter-guided training modules for both types of 





reappraisals and opportunities to practice. For positive reappraisal, participants 
were told to think about the depicted situations by focusing on potential positive 
aspects or outcomes, and for minimizing reappraisal, to think about potential 
neutral aspects or outcomes. For natural response trials, participants were told to 
view and think about the images as they normally would. Stimuli were presented 
with E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools). Participants made behavioral 
responses on a five-button response pad.  
A separate cohort of participants completed a behavioral study in which 
they received identical training procedures, viewed a subset of the same images 
(38 of the 60 used in the MRI study; mean valence=2.41; mean arousal=5.97), 
and were asked to type for each image a short phrase or sentence representing 
the content of their natural response, minimizing reappraisal, or positive 
reappraisal. 
Behavioral analysis 
 Behavioral ratings of negative and positive affect tended to be negatively 
correlated within-participant (mean r=-.36 for natural response; mean r=-.43 for 
positive reappraisal; mean r=-.29 for minimizing reappraisal). These ratings were 
differenced (positive – negative) to yield the overall valence of reported 
experience on each trial of the task. Next, valence reports were averaged within-
participant and analyzed with planned t-tests to test hypotheses about effects of 
positive reappraisal and minimizing reappraisal on the valence of affective 
experience. Ratings of negative and positive affect were also used to compute a 





score for success in changing affective valence by down-regulating negative 
affect (mean Natural Response rating – mean Positive Reappraisal rating) and 
up-regulating positive affect (mean Positive Reappraisal rating – mean Natural 
Response rating).  
Reappraisal and natural response texts (generated by a separate cohort) 
were processed with Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (liwc.net), a 
prominent dictionary-based text analysis software, yielding proportions of words 
from LIWC negative emotion (negemo) and positive emotion (posemo) 
categories used by participants on each trial. These text proportions were also 
averaged within-participant and analyzed with planned t-tests. Finally, texts were 
also processed with a dictionary-free text analytic method (Fellows, 2014) in 
order to descriptively visualize relative frequencies of particular words across 
positive reappraisal, minimizing reappraisal, and natural response conditions. 
fMRI analysis 
 Preprocessing/GLM. Data preprocessing was conducted with SPM8 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, UCL), and consisted of slice-time 
correction, realignment, coregistration of functional and structural images, and 
normalization to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain by 
segmentation of the structural image and applying the parameters from this step 
during warping. Normalized images were interpolated to 3mm3 voxels and 
smoothed with a 6mm Gaussian kernel.  
 First-level (individual) GLM analyses were implemented in NeuroElf v1.0 





(see Wager et al., 2005), in order to reduce the influence of time-series outliers 
(e.g., sudden head motion or other artifactual changes in signal intensity) on the 
estimated model parameters. Cue, stimulus, and response periods of each trial 
were modeled as boxcar functions convolved with the canonical hemodynamic 
response function. Separate stimulus regressors were entered for positive 
reappraisal, natural response (within positive reappraisal block), neutral images 
(within positive reappraisal block), minimizing reappraisal, natural response 
(within minimizing reappraisal block) conditions, and neutral images (within 
minimizing reappraisal block) as well as condition-centered parametric 
regressors for trial-by-trial reports of valence (i.e. positive affect rating minus 
negative affect rating) in each of these four conditions. Motion parameters and a 
high pass temporal filter for 128 seconds were added as regressors of no 
interest.  
 Second-level (group) random-effects analyses were implemented in 
NeuroElf v1.0. All activation peaks are reported in standard Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Regions of interest (ROIs) for bilateral 
amygdala (L -25, -2,-18; R 27, -2, -28; 5324 mm3) and nucleus accumbens (L -9, 
11,-7; R 9, 12, -6; 1422 mm3) were defined anatomically, using volumes from the 
Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas (thresholded at 25% probability), and an ROI 
for vmPFC (peak 0, 46 ,-6; 4860 mm3) was defined on the basis of a meta-
analysis identifying brain regions carrying a monotonic, modality-independent 
signal for subjective reward value (shown in Figure 9 of Bartra et al., 2013). An 





by computing the contrast of [natural response (both blocks)] > [neutral images 
(both blocks)] within the mask for bilateral amygdala at p<.05, identifying a 
cluster of 33 contiguous voxels within the left amygdala. This targeted ROI 
allowed us to test for modulation of the region of the amygdala that was 
responsive to the presentation of aversive images. For effect size estimation 
across entire ROIs, beta estimates were extracted, and means and standard 
errors were computed. For search analyses within ROIs, small-volume correction 
was applied to achieve a corrected p value of <.05, using Gaussian Random 
Field theory to estimate the number of independent resolution elements in each 
ROI. For whole-brain analyses, cluster-extent thresholding was applied, using 
AlphaSim Monte Carlo simulation to achieve a whole-brain familywise error rate 
(FWER) corrected p value of < .05, with a primary threshold of p = .005  (i.e., z ≈ 
2.6) and smoothness parameters (9.7mm-11.4mm) estimated from the residuals 
of each statistical map to determine a minimum number of contiguous voxels, k 
(from 103 to 142 for individual contrasts; 10 for a conjunction map). 
Functional connectivity. To examine changes in coactivation across brain 
regions, we conducted a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis. As a 
seed, we used the region of vmPFC that parametrically tracked affect ratings for 
positive reappraisal to a greater extent than natural response and minimizing 
reappraisal trials, as identified in a whole-brain parametric analysis. For this PPI, 
regressors were entered for each experimental condition, the seed-region time 
series, and interaction terms for the seed-region time series and the experimental 





reappraisal condition over the natural response and minimizing reappraisal 
conditions (i.e., [1 -0.5 -0.5]) to identify regions of the brain that change in 
connectivity with vmPFC for positive reappraisal relative to the other task 
conditions. Next, we correlated this PPI map with success scores to identify 
regions for which connectivity was correlated with behavioral success in positive 
reappraisal. 
 
Figure 2.2 A) Effects of experimental condition on self-reported valence of affective 
experience. B) Effects of experimental condition on use of words from negative emotion 
(negemo) and positive emotion (posemo) categories. C) Comparison cloud visualizing 
individual words that show the highest relative frequencies of use for natural response 




Manipulation check: Positive reappraisal and minimizing reappraisal had 
distinct effects on affective experience and linguistic behavior 
First we asked whether positive reappraisal, minimizing reappraisal, and 
natural responses were associated with differences in self-reported affect. As 
expected, relative to the natural response condition, when using minimizing 





t(19)=10.71,p<.0001, and when using positive reappraisal participants reported 
feeling less negative and more positive (i.e. engendering positively valenced 
responses), t(19)=18.16, p<.0001 (see Figure 2.2A).  
To provide insight into the content of reappraisals, in a separate cohort of 
participants we asked whether word use differed in brief typed texts representing 
the content of their natural responses, positive reappraisals, and minimizing 
reappraisals. We found an interaction of condition (natural response, minimizing 
reappraisal, positive reappraisal) and word category (negative emotion words, 
positive emotion words), F(1,19) = 57.87, p<.0001, on proportion of emotion 
words used in these texts. Compared to natural response texts, we found that 
positive reappraisal texts had fewer negative emotion words, t(19)=10.31, 
p<.0001, and more positive emotion words, t(19)=3.47, p=.002. Similarly, 
compared to natural response texts, minimizing reappraisal texts had fewer 
negative emotion words, t(19)=8.46, p<.0001, and more positive emotion words 
at a trending level of significance, t(19)=1.85, p=.08. Finally, positive reappraisal 
texts had more positive emotion words than did minimizing reappraisal texts, 
t(19)=2.96, p=.008 (see Figure 2.2B). Next we used a data-driven text analytic 
method to identify words occurring at disproportionately high frequency for texts 
from a given condition. Words identified by this analysis are displayed in Figure 
2.2C, a descriptive visualization of differences in word use across condition (text 
size reflects relative frequency for a given experimental condition relative to the 





Hypothesis 1: Positive reappraisal and minimizing reappraisal engaged 
common regions of prefrontal and parietal cortex 
Next we turned to data from the fMRI study, focusing on the period of 
image presentation during which reappraisals are being implemented. In order to 
identify the regions of the brain associated with implementing positive reappraisal 
and minimizing reappraisal, we computed contrasts of both positive reappraisal > 
natural response (within the positive reappraisal block) and minimizing 
reappraisal > natural response (within the minimizing reappraisal block) 
conditions.  
For positive reappraisal, we found activation in bilateral vlPFC (L -48, 27, -
18; R 51, 24, -15), bilateral dlPFC (L -33, 9, 51; R 18, 60, 30), bilateral dmPFC (L 
-3, 27, 33; R 6, 21, 33), left posterior parietal cortex (-45, - 57, 30), bilateral 
temporal lobe (L -57, -24, -15; R 54, -12, -33), left dorsal caudate (-15, 9, 12) and 
left putamen (-15, 12, 0). For minimizing reappraisal, we found activation in left 
vlPFC (-48, 30, -9), left dlPFC (-48, 18, 33), bilateral dmPFC (L -3, 27, 36; R 12, 
18, 57), and left posterior parietal (-54, -66, 24). In order to identify neural 
mechanisms common to both types of reappraisal, we computed the conjunction 
of these two contrasts, revealing activity in left vlPFC (-51, 15, 3), left dlPFC (-39, 
21, 42), bilateral dmPFC (L -3, 27, 36; R 12, 18, 57), left posterior parietal cortex 
(-51, -57, 36), and both anterior (-42, -3, -42) and posterior (-60, -33, -6) regions 
of left lateral temporal cortex (see Figure 2.3A). Considering differences in the 
brain mechanisms associated with the state of implementing positive 





reappraisal > natural response] > [minimizing reappraisal > natural response] 
resulted in no significant whole brain clusters. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. A) Common regions of activation for minimizing and positive 
reappraisal, identified with a conjunction of reappraisal contrasts. B) Mean betas 
(±SE) extracted from an anatomically and functionally constrained amygdala ROI 
indicate more negative trial-to-trial modulation of the amygdala for minimizing 
reappraisal than positive reappraisal. C) Mean betas (±SE) extracted from an 
anatomical nucleus accumbens ROI and a meta-analytically defined vmPFC ROI 
indicate more positive trial-to-trial modulation for positive reappraisal than 
minimizing reappraisal.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Minimizing reappraisal modulated activity in the amygdala 
more so than positive reappraisal 
Next we asked whether the two types of reappraisal differed in the extent 
to which they modulated activity in the amygdala from trial to trial. We examined 
betas for parametric valence regressors from an anatomically and functionally 





amygdala sensitive to the presentation of negative images. We found an 
interaction between reappraisal tactic (positive reappraisal, minimizing 
reappraisal) and trial type (reappraisal trial, natural response trial), F(1, 19)=5.55, 
p=.03, for the parametric betas extracted from the amygdala. Critically, there was 
a difference, t(19)=2.87, p=.01, between the parametric effects for minimizing 
reappraisal (mean b=-.044, 95%CI[-.081, -.007]) and positive reappraisal (mean 
b=.014, 95%CI[-.005, .034]), indicating that activity in this amygdala ROI was 
negatively modulated from trial to trial for minimizing reappraisal (such that less 
amygdala activity was apparent for trials for which less negatively valenced affect 
was reported), but not for positive reappraisal (see Figure 2.3B).  
Hypothesis 3: Positive reappraisal modulated activity in the ventral 
striatum and vmPFC more so than minimizing reappraisal or natural 
responding 
Next we asked whether positive reappraisal differs from minimizing 
reappraisal and natural responding in the extent to which it modulates activity in 
regions of the brain associated with reward. For positive reappraisal we observed 
positive parametric tracking of affective valence within the nucleus accumbens (L 
-9, 21, -9; R 12, 15, -12; SVC p<.05) and vmPFC (6, 33, -15; SVC p<.05) ROIs, 
such that greater activity was observed in these regions for trials where 
participants reported greater positive affect.  
Extracting average parametric betas from bilateral nucleus accumbens 
revealed an interaction between reappraisal tactic and trial type, F(1,19)=10.48, 





effects for positive reappraisal (mean b=.030, 95%CI[.006, .053]) versus 
minimizing reappraisal (mean b=-.026, 95%CI[-.063, .011]), and a difference, 
t(19)=4.55, p=.0002, between parametric effects for positive reappraisal versus 
the intermixed natural response condition (mean b=-.055, 95%CI[-.088, -.022]) 
(see Figure 2.3C). Extracting average parametric betas from the vmPFC 
revealed an interaction between reappraisal tactic and trial type, F(1,19)=7.67, 
p=.01. Critically, there was a difference, t(19)=3.43, p=.003, between parametric 
effects for positive reappraisal (mean b=.042, 95%CI[.002, .081]) versus 
minimizing reappraisal (mean β=.-.043, 95%CI[-.077, -.001]), and a difference, 
t(19)=2.60, p=.02, between parametric effects for positive reappraisal versus the 




Figure 2.4. Regions tracking trial-to-trial affect for positive reappraisal condition 
more so than minimizing reappraisal or natural response, identified with a whole-
brain contrast of parametric maps corrected at FWE p<.05. Mean betas shown 
for descriptive visualization -- because these betas were derived from clusters 






To follow up on these targeted ROI-based analyses, we computed a 
whole-brain contrast of parametric maps to identify regions, across the entire 
brain, that linearly tracked affective valence ratings more for the positive 
reappraisal condition than for the minimizing reappraisal or intermixed natural 
response conditions (positive reappraisal > minimizing reappraisal + natural 
response). Because stimuli were counterbalanced across conditions, this 
analysis identified regions that tracked affect differentially as a result of the 
manipulation of experimental condition rather than as a result of stimulus factors 
(like trial-to-trial variation in image intensity). This analysis revealed significantly 
more positive parametric tracking of affect for positive reappraisal (compared to 
minimizing reappraisal and natural response conditions) within bilateral ventral 
striatum (L 12, 18, -6; R -12, 21, -9) and a subgenual region of right vmPFC (9, 
27, -15) (see Figure 2.4), and no other regions. In a follow-up analysis, we asked 
what regions of the brain showed a full cross-over interaction of parametric 
effects [positive reappraisal – intermixed natural response > minimizing 
reappraisal – intermixed natural response] – similarly, this revealed activity in 
ventral striatum (L -9, 18, -9; R 12, 18, -6) and vmPFC (3, 21, -9) but no other 
regions. These results indicate that ventral striatal and vmPFC regions of the 
brain positively track reported affect for the positive reappraisal condition to a 







Figure 2.5. A) Connectivity between vmPFC seed region and amygdala is 
enhanced for positive reappraisal, relative to natural response condition. B) More 
positive connectivity between vmPFC seed region and amygdala, nucleus 
accumbens, dmPFC, and dlPFC regions predicts greater positive reappraisal 
success. Activations within amygdala and ventral striatum ROIs displayed at 
p<.005 uncorrected, and positive reappraisal success by connectivity beta 
scatterplots shown for descriptive visualization. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Positive reappraisal enhanced positive connectivity 
between vmPFC and amygdala 
Hypothesizing that positive reappraisal relies on enhanced connectivity 
between the vmPFC and amygdala, we next conducted analyses that probed 
patterns of functional coactivation across the brain. In a functional connectivity 
(psychophysiological interaction) analysis, we used the region of the vmPFC 
identified in the contrast of parametric maps above (representing the vmPFC 
region tracking positive affect for positive reappraisal)  as a seed, and asked 
what regions of the brain show enhanced coactivation with this vmPFC seed for 





Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that vmPFC showed enhanced 
connectivity during positive reappraisal with left amygdala (peak -18, -6, -15; 
SVC p<.05) (see Figure 2.5A). In a corresponding whole-brain analysis, no 
regions showed increased connectivity at significant or trend-level thresholds.  
Hypothesis 4b: More positive vmPFC connectivity with amygdala, striatum, 
dmPFC, and dlPFC correlated with positive reappraisal success 
Lastly, we conducted a follow-up analysis to ask whether differences in 
connectivity between vmPFC and other brain regions underlie person-to-person 
variability in positive reappraisal success. To do this, we computed a map 
reflecting, for each voxel, the correlation between each participant’s vmPFC 
connectivity beta (for positive reappraisal versus minimizing reappraisal and 
natural response trial types) and his or her positive reappraisal success score 
(reflecting success in up-regulating positive affect and down-regulating negative 
affect on positive reappraisal trials). We first examined a priori ROIs for amygdala 
and nucleus accumbens, and found that person-to-person differences in positive 
reappraisal success were correlated with the extent to which vmPFC showed 
positive connectivity with bilateral amygdala (L -21, -3, -12;  R 18, -9, -12; SVC 
p<.05), and bilateral nucleus accumbens (L -12, 15, -6; R 18, 9, -12;  SVC 
p<.05). Next we did a corresponding whole-brain analysis, and found that 
person-to-person differences in positive reappraisal success also were correlated 
with connectivity betas for dmPFC (-3, 36, 33) and left dlPFC (-30, 30, 36) (see 
Figure 2.5B). These analyses indicate that person-to-person differences in 





arousal, positive value, and cognitive control were correlated with positive 
reappraisal success.  
Discussion 
A primary form of resilient coping involves finding positive meaning in 
negative life experiences. Here we performed the first test of the neural systems 
underlying this ability. Behaviorally, we found that positive reappraisal increased 
positive emotion and changed use of valenced linguistic content to a greater 
extent than did minimizing reappraisal. With fMRI, we found that successful 
minimizing reappraisal decreased activity in the amygdala, but successful 
positive reappraisal increased activity in ventral striatum and vmPFC regions 
associated with reward and positive affect such that activity in these regions 
tracked reports of more positive emotional experience. Finally, we found that that 
positive reappraisal was associated with enhanced connectivity between vmPFC 
and amygdala, and person-to-person differences in connectivity between vmPFC 
and amygdala, ventral striatum, dmPFC, and dlPFC predicted overall success in 
using positive reappraisal. 
Implications for neural models of emotion regulation 
 Where brain models of emotion regulation have previously highlighted the 
importance of interacting brain systems for top-down control and bottom-up 
generation of emotion, the results of this study extend these models in three 
ways. First, our results indicate a specific role for ventral striatal and vmPFC 
regions as a mechanism specific to positive reappraisal, and not minimizing 





designed to detect this pattern and may have failed to do so because they used 
reappraisal instructions that emphasized minimizing reappraisal (or did not 
clearly distinguish between minimizing and positive reappraisal), or because they 
applied a contrast-based analytic approach, rather than using parametric 
analyses to systematically relate reports of affective experience to underlying 
brain systems. 
 Second, brain models of emotion have highlighted that regulatory 
strategies can bring about decreased activity in the amygdala, concluding that 
diminished activity in this region reflects a decrease in negative emotion (see 
Denny et al., 2014; Ohira, et al., 2006). However, our data suggest that 
modulation of the amygdala is not the only brain indicator of successful 
regulation of negative emotion. Using positive reappraisal to enhance the positive 
meaning of a stimulus maintains motivational relevance and affective arousal, but 
shifts experienced emotional valence from negative to positive (McRae, 
Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012; Shiota & Levenson, 2012). Our data identify 
engagement of ventral striatum and vmPFC reward valuation regions, and 
enhanced vmPFC-amygdala positive coupling, as neural mechanisms that 
underpin this shift in valence. 
Third, the present data shed new light on models of emotion regulation, 
and self-regulation more generally, positing that prefrontal control systems act in 
opposition to systems involved in emotion generation. On such views, increasing 
activity in one system, in the vmPFC for example, down-regulates activity in 





2010; Diekhof et al., 2011). However, we did not observe that vmPFC down-
regulates activity in the amygdala during positive reappraisal but rather that 
vmPFC and amygdala showed enhanced positive coupling, and the extent of this 
coupling was positively correlated with successfully changing one’s emotional 
response from negative to positive. Thus, our data align better with theories 
describing the vmPFC as a nexus point that integrates information from cortical 
and subcortical brain regions (Rangel & Hare, 2010; Roy et al., 2012). Beyond 
the amygdala, our data suggest that positive reappraisal success relies on 
vmPFC connectivity with a suite of regions associated with affective arousal, 
cognitive control, and positive value (see Barrett & Satpute, 2013). 
Implications for the study of healthy and clinical variability in affective 
experience 
Our findings also raise novel questions for understanding clinical and 
subclinical variability in affective processes. Previous work suggests that emotion 
regulation ability can moderate the relationship between life stressors and 
depressive symptoms (Troy et al., 2010), that regulation of positive affect may 
reflect a transdiagnostic mechanism of emotional disturbance (Carl, Soskin, 
Kerns, & Barlow, 2013), and that people suffering from depression show reduced 
ability to sustain affective responses to positive stimuli (Heller et al., 2009). We 
found that individual differences in positive reappraisal success related to 
functional connectivity of vmPFC, with dlPFC, dmPFC, amygdala, and ventral 
striatum, suggesting that these regions form a functional network that supports 





A crucial future direction will be to connect models of the brain 
mechanisms underlying positive meaning to the broader literature on resilience 
and recovery from stressful life events. Although everyone experiences 
stressors, how we respond to them can range from protracted disability to 
functional maintenance and growth. Positive reappraisal ability, supported by 
vmPFC connectivity with amygdala, ventral striatum, and prefrontal cortex, could 
be one factor that underlies such variability. Future work that integrates models 
of genetic, environmental, and neural underpinnings of variable responses to 
stress may help us understand where resilience comes from and how to optimize 
it (see Bonnano, 2004; Russo et al., 2012). Importantly, future studies of this kind 
will benefit from larger sample sizes, enabling more precise estimation of within- 
and (especially) between-person brain-behavior relationships, and detection of 
smaller magnitude effects.  
Conclusion 
When life takes a turn for the worse, we can not only minimize our 
negative reactions, but fundamentally transform them to experience positive 
emotions like hope, gratitude, and love. Although negativity-minimizing and 
positivity-enhancing forms of emotion regulation are similar in that they rely on 
brain systems for controlled processing, they are distinct in that minimizing 
reappraisal modulates brain systems associated with affective arousal, whereas 
positive reappraisal modulates brain systems associated with reward value. Here 
we describe these distinct pathways to regulatory success, and consider their 





hope that future work will expand on our approach to uncover the basic biological 
mechanisms that underlie our ability to respond flexibly and adaptively to the 












Distressing events are unavoidable, but how we respond to them can be a 
matter of deliberate choice.  Converging evidence suggests that one such choice 
– the choice to effortfully regulate one’s negative emotions, as opposed to letting 
them unfold naturally – serves a critical protective function for well-being (Major 
et al., 1998; Russo et al., 2012; Sheppes et al., 2014). Although dozens of 
imaging studies have focused on the brain systems supporting the regulation of 
emotion (reviewed in Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner, et al., 2012), none have given 
participants the choice as to whether or not they will regulate their emotions, 
instead instructing participants when to regulate vs. respond naturally. As such, 
the neural processes supporting agentic decisions to regulate emotional 
responses are unknown.  
We sought to build a predictive model of these decisions as a step toward 
a neuroscientific understanding of the different ways individuals respond to 
aversive life experiences (see Russo et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2015). We began 
with the idea that specific brain processes measured by neuroimaging – here, 
those associated with the generation and regulation of emotion – could be used 
to predict subsequent behavioral outcomes that depend on engagement of the 
same or similar brain processes (see Berkman and Falk, 2013). This led us to 
ask whether brain activity evoked during initial uninstructed encounters with 
affectively charged events (when one is spontaneously reacting and/or 





to regulate one’s emotional responses to those events, when the choice to 
regulate is presented explicitly. 
We focused on reappraisal, a regulation strategy that entails thinking 
differently about a negative stimulus in order to change how one feels about it 
(e.g., looking for a potential bright side or otherwise taking a new perspective) 
(see Ochsner et al., 2012). Instructed implementation of reappraisal reliably 
increases activity within a network of regions implicated in cognitive control, 
including ventrolateral prefrontal (vlPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal (dlPFC), and 
dorsomedial prefrontal (dmPFC) cortices, and can influence activity in the 
amygdala, a subcortical brain region involved in triggering affective responses 
(see Buhle et al., 2014; Phelps and Ledoux, 2005). Building on these prior 
neuroimaging studies, we derived a priori brain predictors of activity triggered by 
an initial encounter with a stimulus that could predict subsequent decisions to 
regulate one’s emotional responses to that stimulus. Predictors included 1) 
activity in the amygdala, 2) activity in vlPFC, dlPFC, and dmPFC regions, and 3) 
a whole-brain pattern reflecting the global network of activity associated with 
implementing reappraisal (see van Ast et al., 2016; Woo et al., 2015). 
To address these questions, we first trained participants in what 
reappraisal is and how to use it – ensuring they were knowledgeable about what 
a choice to regulate emotion would entail. Next, we used functional magnetic 
imaging (fMRI) to measure brain responses during a negative image viewing 
task, when participants were free to think about the images in any way they 





ones – and asked participants to decide whether to regulate their emotions or 
simply view the images. This design allowed us to test the hypothesis that 
variability in brain responses associated with emotional reactivity and/or emotion 
regulation evoked during the negative image viewing task would be predictive of 
these emotion regulation decisions, above and beyond stimulus and self-report 
variables. This hypothesis was tested at both (1) the level of the person, asking 
whether we could predict the individuals for whom decisions to regulate would be 
most likely (i.e., their brain activity would predict more frequent decisions to 
regulate not just for previously seen stimuli, but for new stimuli as well), and (2) 
at the level of the stimulus, asking whether we could predict the events for which 
decisions to regulate would be most likely. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants  
Participants were 20 adults (12F, 8M) recruited from the New York City 
area (mean age = 24.6, SD=4.5), and screened to confirm that they were right-
handed, could read and speak fluently in English, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, had never been diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder, did not 
report current depressive symptoms (i.e., scored below 16 on the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale), and had no conditions that 
contraindicated magnetic resonance imaging. Informed consent was obtained 
according to procedures approved by the Columbia University Institutional 






Data were acquired on a 3T GE MR750 whole-body scanner with a 32-
channel RF head coil. Structural volumes were acquired using a high-resolution 
T1-weighted sagittal 3D BRAVO sequence yielding 1mm3 isotropic voxel size. 
Functional volumes were acquired using a T2*-sensitive echo planar imaging EPI 
sequence with a repetition time TR of 2000ms, an echo time TE of 25ms, a 77° 
flip angle, and a 19.2cm FOV consisting of 45 interleaved 3mm slices acquired 
parallel to the AC-PC axis.  
Design 
Emotion regulation training/practice. Immediately before scanning, all participants 
completed experimenter-guided emotion regulation training modules, which 
included training in positive reappraisal (i.e., focusing on potential positive 
aspects or outcomes of a negative situation) and minimizing reappraisal (i.e., 
focusing on potential neutral aspects or outcomes of a negative situation) 
strategies (see McRae et al., 2012). In the first of two scanner tasks, they applied 
these strategies within an instructed reappraisal task (not of direct interest here). 
Such training and practice in reappraisal helped ensure that participants would 
be knowledgeable about what a choice to regulate emotion (or not to regulate) 
would entail. 
Scanner negative image viewing task. After the instructed task, participants were 
informed that they would be viewing images and were asked to attend to and rate 
their responses to these images, but were not instructed to think about the 
images in a particular way (i.e., they were not instructed to regulate their 






Figure 3.1  A) Negative image viewing task, completed in scanner, and B) emotion 
regulation choice task, completed post in a post-scan session. Predictive models use 
brain responses in the negative image viewing task to predict participant choice 
behaviors in the emotion regulation choice task. 
 
viewing task, which consisted of two runs of 10 trials each. The fact that 
participants had received prior training in, and experience with reappraisal, 
ensured that they knew what reappraisal was and how to do it – and critically – 
were free to choose to engage with stimuli in this task in a way that could clearly 
reflect spontaneous decisions to reappraise.  Figure 3.1A shows the trial 
sequence for this task, consisting of image viewing period, inter-stimulus interval 
(ISI), affect rating period (positive and negative affect ratings appeared in a 
randomized order), and inter-trial interval (ITI). Images (mean normative 
valence=2.49; mean normative arousal=5.71) were selected from the 
International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 2008), and were 





depicted instances of illness and injury, human and animal waste, acts of 
aggression, members of hate groups, and transportation accidents. For the affect 
ratings, we asked participants to base their ratings on how negative and positive 
they felt at the end of the image viewing period. Stimuli were presented with E-
Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools), and participants made behavioral 
responses on a five-button response pad. 
Emotion regulation choice task. Immediately after leaving the scanner, 
participants completed a surprise final task in which they viewed in a random 
order the 20 negative images presented in the task plus 20 novel negative 
images matched on content, arousal, and valence and were asked to choose 
whether they would prefer to 1) regulate their emotional response to the image 
with reappraisal, or 2) simply look at the image without reappraising (see Figure 
3.1). When participants chose to regulate, they were additionally asked to choose 
to regulate via either positive reappraisal (i.e., find positive meaning) or via 
minimizing reappraisal (i.e., dampen negative emotions). Stimuli were presented 
with E-Prime 1.2 (Psychology Software Tools), and participants made behavioral 
responses on a keyboard. 
fMRI Analyses 
Preprocessing/GLM. Data were preprocessed with SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Cognitive Neurology, UCL), and consisted of slice-time correction, 
realignment, coregistration of functional and structural images, and normalization 
to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain by segmentation of 





Normalized images were interpolated to 3mm3 voxels and smoothed with a 6mm 
Gaussian kernel.  
 First-level (individual participant) GLM analyses were implemented in 
NeuroElf v1.0 (neuroelf.net). Stimulus and response periods of each trial were 
modeled as boxcar functions convolved with the canonical hemodynamic 
response function. Motion parameters and a high-pass filter for 128 seconds 
were included as regressors of no interest. All analyses focused on brain signal 
estimated during the stimulus (image viewing) period of each trial.  
 Second-level (group) random-effects analyses were implemented in 
NeuroElf v1.0. All brain coordinates are reported in standard MNI space. For our 
follow-up whole-brain analysis significant voxels were identified using a joint 
height (p=.0025) and extent (k=103) threshold determined by AlphaSim, using 
smoothness parameters estimated from the residuals of the statistical map 
(11.7mm). 
 Regions of interest. Regions of interest (ROIs) were constructed for 
bilateral amygdala, and bilateral vlPFC , dlPFC, and dmPFC – all regions known 
to be important for reappraisal (Ochsner et al., 2012). The amygdala ROI was 
defined anatomically from the Harvard-Oxford anatomical atlas for 25% 
probability (L -23, -5, -18; R 23, -4, -18) (5324 mm3), and three ROIs for bilateral 
vlPFC (L -51, 21, 9; R 60, 24, 3) (14121 mm3), bilateral dlPFC (L 51, 15, 48; R -
33, 3, 54) (8235 mm3), and a region spanning bilateral dmPFC (9, 30, 39) (8343 
mm3) were constructed from the results of a meta-analysis from our lab of 48 





these prefrontal ROIs directly from the statistical map resulting from this meta-
analysis (provided by the authors), by selecting the clusters of contiguous voxels 
in vlPFC, dlPFC, and dmPFC that achieved whole-brain significance in the meta-
analytic contrast of reappraisal greater than natural response (reported in Table 1 
of Buhle et al., 2014).  
 Pattern expression analyses. We conducted pattern expression analyses 
in order to test whether whole-brain responses to individual images could predict 
subsequent choices to reappraise those images. Previous studies using this 
approach have asked whether expression of a brain pattern associated with 
working memory is modulated by social threat (van Ast, et al., 2016) and whether 
a pattern predictive of physical pain is modulated by emotion regulation (Woo et 
al., 2015). Our analyses used the “single-trial” or “beta-series” approach 
(Koyama et al., 2003) to estimate brain responses for each trial of the negative 
image viewing task for each participant, We did this by building a GLM that 
included trial-specific regressors for each image presented in the viewing task in 
addition to regressors for stimulus and response periods, motion parameters, 
and a high-pass filter for 128 seconds.  
 In order to calculate the extent to which trial-level beta images expressed 
the meta-analytic reappraisal pattern (from Buhle et al., 2014), we treated the 
unthresholded meta-analytic map as a pattern of weights, reflecting the degree to 
which each voxel is reliably associated in the extant literature with implementing 
reappraisal. We then calculated the dot-product of the activation image for each 





map (weight map), yielding a continuous scalar value (beta map ∙ weight map), 
reflecting the extent to which each trial-level beta map expressed the weight map 
pattern. These values were mean-centered by participant to yield a measure of 
within-subject variation in reappraisal pattern expression relative to their average.  
 Person- and trial-level prediction. We used R (cran.r-project.org) to 
implement person-level Poisson regression models (using glm from the ‘stats’ 
package) and multilevel logistic regression models (using glmer from the ‘lme4’ 
package) to test whether brain activity in our ROIs and expression of the whole-
brain reappraisal pattern could predict counts of person-level choice behavior 
(i.e., the number of times each person chose to reappraise, from 0-40), and trial-
level choices (coded as 0 – chose to look naturally without reappraising; 1 – 
chose to reappraise). Fitted multilevel models included parameters allowing 
model intercept and slopes to vary by participant when estimating effect sizes 
(see Barr et al., 2015), and, for model comparisons, varying slope parameters 
were included where supported by the data (see Bates et al., 2015). We 
implemented mediation analyses in R (using mediate from the ‘mediation’ 
package). Where noted, we adjusted for normative ratings of image intensity (i.e., 
both valence and arousal norms) (Lang et al., 2008), and self-report ratings of 
negative and positive affect by including these variables as covariates. All 
predictor variables were standardized, yielding as measures of effect size beta 
coefficients indicating the expected difference in the outcome variable across a 





equal to the log of the incidence rate ratio, and logistic coefficients the log of the 
odds ratio, across a one-unit change in the predictor.)  
An important consideration in these analyses is that trial-level estimates 
can be strongly affected by acquisition artifacts that occur during that trial (e.g., 
sudden motion, scanner pulse artifacts, etc.). For this reason, trials with an 
estimated Mahalanobis distance (across pattern expression and ROI variables) 
±3 standard deviations from the grand mean were excluded in multilevel models 
and when calculating participant averages (less than 2% of all observations). 
Estimating model predictive accuracy. To estimate the out-of-sample 
predictive accuracy of our linear models, we approximated Bayesian leave-one-
out cross validation using Pareto-smoothed importance sampling (LOO; Vehtari 
et al., 2016), fitting models with uniform priors via the Bayesian inference 
package Stan (mc-stan.org). Instead of model re-fitting, as in exact cross-
validation, the LOO procedure draws samples from posterior distributions of the 
model parameters in order to estimate expected log-likelihood for new data and 
thus adjust for over-optimism (i.e., bias) inherent to within-sample measures of 
model fit (e.g., the uncorrected log-likelihood). We used this procedure to derive 
LOO-adjusted deviance values (LOOIC) that can be used to compare models in 
terms of their expected out-of-sample predictive accuracy. This is conceptually 
similar to comparing AIC scores (which also approximate a model’s out-of-
sample predictive accuracy), and, to a lesser extent, BIC scores (which 
approximate a model’s marginal likelihood – the likelihood of observing the data 





examined as well (see Gelman et al., 2014).  Lastly, we applied receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis (implemented with the ‘ROCR’ package 
in R) to assess predictive performance of our multilevel logistic regression 
models. In the ROC framework, model performance is expressed as the area 
under the curve (AUC) in a plot of the model’s sensitivity (the proportion of 
reappraisal choices correctly predicted as such) against its specificity (the 
proportion of look naturally choices correctly predicted as such) across a range of 
prediction thresholds. The AUC can be interpreted as the probability that a 
randomly selected image/trial where reappraisal was actually chosen is predicted 
as more likely to be reappraised than a randomly chosen image/trial where 
reappraisal was not chosen. Thus, AUC represents a threshold-independent 
metric of model performance, with values from 0.5 (prediction at chance) to 1 
(perfect prediction). 
Results 
Brain responses in amygdala and prefrontal cortex predict person-to-
person differences in emotion regulation choices  
ROI-based prediction of person-level reappraisal choice frequencies. In an 
initial analysis, we aggregated our data to the person level (i.e., computed choice 
frequencies and average brain activity estimates for each person) to run 
regression models asking whether person-to-person differences in activity within 
our a priori ROIs during viewing of negative images could predict the number of 
times each participant subsequently chose to use reappraisal in the reappraisal 





reappraisal choices were predicted by greater activity in the amygdala, b=.17, 
95%CI[.07, .27], p<.001, as well as vlPFC, b=.14, 95%CI[.05, .23], p=.002, 
dlPFC, b=.19, 95%CI[.09, .28], p<.001, and dmPFC, b=.24, 95%CI[.15, .33], 
p<.001. Each of these relationships remained nonzero when adjusting for self-
report ratings of positive and negative affect, amygdala b=.20, 95%CI[.10, .32], 
p<.001, vlPFC, b=.10, 95%CI[.01, .20], p=.03, dlPFC, b=.16, 95%CI[.06, .27], 
p=.001, and dmPFC, b=.23, 95%CI[.13, .33], p<.001, indicating that greater 
responses in these regions during viewing of negative images predicted emotion 
regulation choice frequency independent of affective experience while viewing 
images in the scanner.  
Prediction of decisions for old versus novel images. In the reappraisal 
choice task, participants made decisions about whether to regulate responses to 
20 old images (that had been seen previously in the scanner) and 20 new 
images. The ability of brain activity during the image viewing task to predict 
subsequent reappraisal choices was comparable across old and new images for 
the amygdala, bold =.15, 95%CI[.01, .29], p=.04, bnew =.19, 95%CI[.05, .33], 
p=.007, and for the prefrontal cortex, bold =.22, 95%CI[.09, .35], p<.001, bnew 
=.22, 95%CI[.09, .34], p<.001. These results suggest that the person-to-person 
predictive value of these ROIs was comparable for previously seen and never 






Figure 3.2 Scatterplots and generalized linear model fits reflecting predictive 
relationships between person-to-person variability in brain activity in the negative image 
viewing task and subsequent reappraisal choice frequencies, for a priori A) anatomically-
defined amygdala, and B) meta-analytically defined dmPFC, dlPFC, and vlPFC bilateral 
regions of interest.  
 
Correlation structure of the regions of interest. Next, we inspected the 
correlation structure of these ROIS, finding that activity in vlPFC, dlPFC, and 
dmPFC was highly correlated (mean r=0.83) and also correlated with activity in 
the amygdala (mean r=0.67). To reduce model complexity, and to reflect 
correspondence with a model of regulation in which different prefrontal regions 
are components of a coordinated system for cognitively controlling emotion (see 
Ochsner et al., 2012), we averaged our vlPFC, dlPFC, and dmPFC ROI variables 






Figure 3.3 A) Plot of regression coefficients (with 95%CI) for the full model (model 2) 
predicting reappraisal choice frequencies from brain and self-report variables (entered 
as simultaneous predictors). B) Model comparison metrics for full model (model 2), and 
reduced model including only negative affect ratings and positive affect ratings (model 
1). Model fit is summarized by leave-one-out cross-validated error (LOOIC), AIC, and 
BIC information criterion scores (i.e., adjusted model deviance, a measure of the relative 
quality of the models for these data). A lower number indicates better fit. 
 
Comparing predictive fit of brain-based and non-brain-based models. A 
crucial question is whether including our amygdala and prefrontal brain variables 
improves the prediction power of our models, relative to models with only self-
report measures of emotion. To address this question, we compared models with 
and without brain predictors in terms of predictive accuracy estimated by cross-
validation (Vehtari et al., 2016; Gelman et al., 2014). As shown in Figure 3.3, a 
model that included the predictors for brain activity (i.e., both the compound 
prefrontal ROI and the amygdala ROI) showed substantially better predictive fit 
by leave-one-out (LOO) cross-validation (Mfull=153.5) than a reduced model 
including only self-report affect ratings (Mreduced=167.9), and was also preferred 





Information Criterion (BIC) (Mfull=149.3; Mreduced =162.6) metrics (see Figure 
3.3A). This indicates that the model with brain predictors was identified as higher 
in expected out-of-sample accuracy (by LOO and AIC), and a more plausible 
model of the data generation process (by BIC), when compared to the model 
including only self-reports of negative and positive affect. (Because all 




Figure 3.4 Greater average amygdala activity in the negative image viewing task 
predicts subsequently choosing to regulate emotion more frequently, and this 
relationship is mediated by greater prefrontal cortex activity during the image viewing 
task.  
 
Person-level mediation analysis. We conducted a follow-up mediation 
analysis to test the evidence for a causal model whereby the effect of amygdala 
activity (the x variable) on subsequent emotion regulation choice frequencies (the 





variable). We found a significant total effect of amygdala activity on reappraisal 
choice frequencies, c =.17, 95%CI[.07, .27], p<.001 that was fully mediated by 
prefrontal cortex activity, a*b = .15, 95%CI[0.05, 0.30], p<.001, such that the 
direct effect of amygdala activity on reappraisal choice frequencies dropped to 
near zero, c’ = 0.02, 95%CI[-.12, 0.11], p=.73 when adjusting for prefrontal 
activity (see Figure 3.4). Although these variables were observed (not 
manipulated), the results of this mediation analysis are consistent with a causal 
model whereby greater spontaneous amygdala reactivity elicits greater 
recruitment of prefrontal regions, which in turn elicits more frequent decisions to 
regulate emotion. 
Follow-up whole-brain analysis for reappraisal choice frequencies  
To complement the primary ROI-based analyses described in the main 
text, we conducted a follow-up whole-brain analysis in order to identify regions of 
the brain that were most strongly correlated with future emotion regulation 
decisions at the person-to-person level. Unlike the ROI analyses, which were 
designed to estimate effect sizes for the predictive relationship between brain 
activity and reappraisal choices for given brain regions, this analysis was 
designed to identify any regions across the whole brain that were highly 
correlated with future choice frequencies. Consistent with the ROI-based 
analyses, we found clusters that positively correlated with reappraisal choice 
frequency within bilateral vlPFC  [L -39, 36,3; R 57,36,12], bilateral dlPFC [L -





regions: bilateral precuneus  [9, -33, 39] and right anterior temporal lobe [R 
33,21,-33] (see Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.5  Regions identified in a whole brain analysis for which person-to-person 
variability in activity during the negative image viewing task was most correlated with 
subsequent reappraisal choices (whole-brain FWE p<.05). 
 
Expression of a distributed brain pattern associated with reappraisal 
predicts stimulus-to-stimulus emotion regulation choices  
Our initial analyses showed that average levels of brain activity in specific 
ROIs could predict person-to-person variability in reappraisal choices (i.e., 
whether people will reappraise frequently or infrequently), but they did not test 
predictions about stimulus-level variability in reappraisal choices (i.e., whether 
patterns of brain activity can be used to predict for which events people are more 





regression models including brain activity as predictors, and trial-level decisions 
to reappraise for specific stimuli in the subsequent choice task as the outcome. 
ROI-based prediction of stimulus-level reappraisal choices. We also used 
multilevel logistic regression to evaluate the predictive value of the amygdala and 
prefrontal ROI variables. Consistent with the single-level models reported above, 
considering only the between-subject component of the ROI variables (i.e., 
average activity within the ROI across all trials for a given person) we found that 
average activity within the amygdala, b=.56, 95%CI[.15, .97], p=.007), and within 
prefrontal control regions, b=.75, 95%CI[.30, 1.19], p=.001, was predictive of 
future choices. However, considering only the within-subject component of these 
variables (i.e., trial-to-trial deflections from these overall person averages), there 
was no trial-by-trial relationship for the amygdala, b=-.06, 95%CI[-.49, .34], 
p=.63, but there was a trend-level positive relationship for the prefrontal regions, 
b=0.20, 95%CI[-.01, .42], p=.07. This suggests that, in contrast to the pattern 
expression variable, these ROI variables may be lower in predictive value for 
trial-to-trial decisions.  
Pattern-based prediction of stimulus-level reappraisal choices. As a more 
global representation of reappraisal-related brain activity occurring while viewing 
each image, we used trial-by-trial expression of the meta-analytically derived 
whole-brain pattern associated with implementing reappraisal (i.e., the whole-
brain map resulting from the Buhle et al., 2014 meta-analysis).  
We used the data from the earlier instructed reappraisal task to validate 





participants were instructed to reappraise or to look at an image without 
reappraising. We found that higher reappraisal pattern expression was predictive 
of experiencing a reappraisal trial, b=.21, 95%CI[.06, .37], p=.007, consistent 
with the notion that the pattern is expressed to a greater degree when the brain is 
in a state of implementing instructed reappraisal versus instructed natural 
responding to negative images.  
Using the data from the image-viewing task, we asked whether expression 
of this whole-brain pattern of interest could prospectively predict decisions to 
reappraise. We found that the trial-to-trial differences in pattern expression 
predicted greater probability of choosing to regulate emotion, b=.31, 95%CI[.07,  
  
Figure 3.6  A) Meta-analytically derived whole-brain pattern associated with regulating 
emotion via reappraisal (display is thresholded at z>2.6, k=20, but all voxels were used 
in analyses). B) Trial-to-trial variability in expression of this pattern (z-transformed) is 
predictive of subsequently choosing to use reappraisal for particular images. 
 
.55], p=.009 (see Figure 3.6). This predictive relationship held when adjusting for 
self-report ratings of positive and negative affect and normative ratings of image 





increasing in magnitude), b=.59, 95%CI[.29, .89], p<.001, when additionally 
adjusting for activity within our individual prefrontal cortex and amygdala ROIs. In 
this overall model, only the prefrontal cortex, b=.61, 95%CI[.18, 1.04], p=.006, 
independently predicted choosing to reappraise, beyond the predictive capacity 
of the pattern expression variable (see Figure 3.7A). 
Comparing predictive fit of brain-based and non brain-based models.  A 
full model, including the pattern expression variable, stimulus-level estimates of 
activity in the prefrontal and amygdala ROIs, self-report ratings, and image 
intensity norms, showed substantially better predictive fit by LOO cross-validation 
(Mfull =492.9) than a model predicting choices from only self-report affect ratings 
and normative ratings of image valence and arousal (Mreduced=505.4) and was 
also preferred by AIC (Mfull=501.7, Mreduced=513.0) and BIC (Mfull=537.6, 
Mreduced=544.9) metrics. This indicates that the model including brain predictors 
was higher in expected out-of-sample accuracy (by LOOIC and AIC) and a more 
plausible model of the data generation process (by BIC), than the reduced model 






Figure 3.7 A) Plot of regression coefficients (with standard error and 95%CI) for the full 
model (model 4) predicting reappraisal choices from brain, self-reports of affect, and 
normative ratings of the images (entered as simultaneous predictors) B) Model 
comparison metrics for full model (model 4), and reduced models with only ROIs, affect, 
and image norms (model 3), affect and image norms (model 2), and image norms only 
(model 1) C) ROC curves depicting prediction accuracy for models 1,2,3, and 4 in terms 
of sensitivity (correct prediction of reappraisal choices) and specificity (correct prediction 
of natural response choices), across a range of possible prediction thresholds. 
 
Next, we used a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to 
quantify the absolute predictive performance of our models (i.e., the models’ 
ability to correctly predict reappraisal choices versus natural response choices). 
Shown in Figure 3.7C, the model with only normative ratings of image arousal 
and valence as predictors had an AUC of 0.56, corresponding to poor prediction 
(shown in purple). The model with normative ratings and participant positive and 
negative affect ratings collected in the scanner had an AUC of 0.61 (shown in 
green). The model with prefrontal and amygdala ROI predictors in addition to 
image norms and affect ratings had an AUC of 0.65 (shown in blue). Finally, the 





reappraisal pattern in addition to these variables had an AUC of 0.71. At a 
prediction threshold of 0.5 (i.e., a predicted probability >0.5 is considered 
predicted reappraisal, and <0.5 is considered predicted natural responding), this 
model showed 70% correct prediction of participant choice behaviors. 
Comparisons of predictive effects for positive reappraisal and minimizing 
reappraisal 
 In the reappraisal choice task, participants were asked to indicate 
whether they would prefer to use minimizing reappraisal (which entails mentally 
diminishing the impact of the negative stimulus), or positive reappraisal (which 
entails finding positive meaning in the negative stimulus). We conducted an 
exploratory follow-up analysis to investigate whether prediction differed across 
these two subtypes of reappraisal. In order to do this, we fit our full model to only 
positive reappraisal choices (i.e., ignoring trials for which minimizing reappraisal 
was chosen) and, subsequently, to only minimizing reappraisal choices (i.e., 
ignoring trials for which positive reappraisal was chosen). In general, the 95% 
confidence intervals for the coefficients estimated for positive and minimizing 
reappraisal largely overlap, although estimates for positive reappraisal are closer 
to and do not exclude zero in some cases (see Figure 3.8A). Comparing positive 
reappraisal choices and minimizing reappraisal choices, there was a directional 
but non-significant difference in the predictive value of prefrontal cortex activity, 
bmin – bpos = .17, 95%CI[-.10, .45], p=.22, and the predictive value of amygdala 





We also asked whether predictive effects differed according to reappraisal type in 
our multilevel models (see Figure 3.8B). In general, the estimated 95% 
confidence intervals derived from these models largely overlap. Notably, the 
pattern expression variable was comparable in its ability to predict positive  
 
 
Figure 3.8 A) Plot of regression coefficients (with 95%CI) for the full model (model 2) 
predicting reappraisal choices from brain and self-report variables (entered as 
simultaneous predictors), fit to all reappraisal choices (in black), as well as only positive 
reappraisal choices (in blue) and only minimizing reappraisal choices (in grey). B) Plot of 
regression coefficients (with standard error and 95%CI) for the full model (model 4) 
predicting reappraisal choices from brain and self-report variables (entered as 
simultaneous predictors), fit to all reappraisal choices (in black), as well as only positive 
reappraisal choice (in blue) and only minimizing reappraisal choices (in grey).  
 
reappraisal versus minimizing reappraisal choices, bmin-bpos=.26, 95%CI[-.29, 
.80], p=.35. However, there were differences for some variables, including: 
normative image arousal, which more strongly predicted minimizing reappraisal 
choices than positive reappraisal choices, bmin-bpos=0.62, 95%CI[.17, 1.07], 





choices than minimizing reappraisal choices, bpos-bmin=0.66, 95%CI[.17, 1.15], 
p=.008.  Finally, there was a directional but non-significant difference in the 
predictive value of of amygdala activity, bmin – bpos = .55, 95%CI[-.31,.1.44]. 
p=.21. 
Discussion 
In order to make contact with translational applications, neuroimaging 
studies must go beyond mapping correlates of experimentally-cued regulation to 
begin constructing neuroscience-informed predictive models that can forecast 
which people will choose to regulate their emotions and for which events they will 
choose to do so (see Doré et al., 2016). Here, we provide the first example of 
such a model, leveraging variability in brain responses to negative images to 
predict spontaneous decisions to regulate emotion. 
Two key findings were obtained. First, at the level of the individual, we 
found that greater activity in the amygdala (a region involved in generating 
emotion), and in vlPFC, dlPFC and dmPFC (regions involved in controlling 
emotion) predicted more frequently choosing to regulate responses to emotional 
events, in general, including novel ones. Notably, the predictive relationship 
between amygdala activity and more frequent reappraisal choices was mediated 
by increased prefrontal activity. Second, at the level of the emotion-eliciting 
stimulus, we found that expression of a meta-analytically defined brain pattern 
associated with implementing reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014) predicted choosing 
to regulate emotional responses for that stimulus. Overall, a predictive model that 





distributed brain pattern showed substantially better performance than a model 
using only emotion self-reports and data on the normative affective potency of 
image stimuli, reaching 70% accuracy in predicting participant choice behaviors.  
Implications for neural models of emotion regulation 
Neural models of emotion regulation have previously highlighted the 
importance of interacting brain systems for the top-down control and bottom-up 
generation of emotion (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2012; Kelley et al., 2015). The results 
of this study extend these models in several ways. First, these data indicate that 
people who show stronger bottom-up reactivity to affective stimuli (as measured 
by amygdala responses) are also more likely to engage prefrontally-mediated 
control processes, and, ultimately, to choose to regulate emotional responses to 
those stimuli. This suggests greater amygdala reactivity and prefrontal 
recruitment as neurobiological mechanisms underpinning the phenomenon of 
being motivated to regulate one’s negative emotional responses. Overall, this 
pattern of data is consistent with a model whereby amygdala responses to a 
negative stimulus may reflect the need to regulate, whereas prefrontal responses 
may reflect spontaneously evoked controlled processing of stimulus meaning 
and/or emotion regulation. 
Second, we found that expressing a distributed brain pattern associated 
with implementing reappraisal was independently predictive of choosing to 
regulate responses to particular stimuli, beyond activity estimates from the 
prefrontal regions alone. This indicates that greater activity in prefrontal regions 





of choosing to regulate emotional responses to particular events. In other words, 
emotion regulation choices are most probable when participants show high 
absolute levels of prefrontal cortex activity in addition to expressing this 
distributed pattern (characterized by relatively more activity in prefrontal regions 
compared to other parts of the brain).  
Third, in a whole–brain analysis we also observed brain-behavior 
correlations with emotion regulation choice frequencies within two regions not of 
primary a priori interest – the precuneus and anterior temporal lobe. Both of 
these regions have been implicated in episodic memory retrieval and social 
cognition, among other functions (Bonner and Price, 2013; Wagner et al., 2005; 
Doré et al., 2014). Future studies could test the role of these regions in regulation 
contexts by asking whether precuneus and anterior temporal activity differ in 
predictive value for choosing to implement emotion regulation strategies that 
differ in demands on social cognition or long-term memory.  
Finally, this study used a brain-as-predictor approach (see Berkman and 
Falk, 2013; Demos et al., 2012) to integrate neural models of emotion regulation 
with emerging theories of cognitive control that distinguish between signaling the 
need for (or expected value of) controlled processing (thought to be subserved 
by the dorsal anterior cingulate and adjacent regions of dmPFC) versus directly 
implementing this control (thought to be subserved by lateral PFC) (see Shenhav 
et al., 2013; Botvinick, 2007; Braver, 2012). Critically, we show that activity in the 
amygdala, lateral PFC, and dmPFC during an initial uninstructed encounter with 





fMRI can detect spontaneous variability in psychological and neural processes – 
like variability in affective reactivity, the tendency to signal a need for top-down 
control, and the tendency to engage top-down control – that can be used to 
predict future emotion regulation behaviors. 
Implications for clinical disorders involving emotion dysregulation 
A common observation in the clinical literature is that patients with 
emotion-related clinical disorders do not show dramatic behavioral deficits on 
laboratory tests of emotion regulation capacity (see Joorman and Vanderlind, 
2014). This suggests that core mechanisms of clinical dysfunction may not be 
well indexed by tasks that directly instruct participants how and when to regulate 
emotion (see Ochsner et al., 2012; Sheppes et al., 2015). Emotional dysfunction 
could be caused by abnormalities in 1) the bottom-up generation of emotion, 2) 
the ability to use top-down strategies for emotion regulation when instructed to, 
and/or 3) the tendency to spontaneously identify emotion regulation opportunities 
and self-initiate use of a regulation strategy (i.e., decisions to regulate or not, 
including selection of a context-appropriate strategy). Although behavioral and 
brain correlates of bottom-up generation and top-down control capacity (1 and 2) 
are typically assessed with existing lab tasks, tendencies to make regulatory 
choices of particular kinds (3) typically are not. Future work could ask whether 
particular clinical disorders are associated with disproportionate disruption in the 
capacity to deploy processes for emotion regulation when instructed versus the 
tendency to use them spontaneously (see Doré et al., 2016). For example, 





spontaneous brain responses (i.e., in the image viewing task), atypical regulatory 
preferences (i.e., in the emotion regulation choice task), or atypical relationships 
between patterns of brain activity and subsequent regulation choices. 
Limitations and future directions 
In this study we used fMRI measurements of brain responses at one time 
point to predict behaviors observed in a relatively controlled lab-based decision-
making task at a later time point. Future studies could extend these findings by 
attempting to relate variability in brain responses to emotional behaviors in 
everyday contexts in which people are typically not prompted to enact regulation 
and are free to select any strategy they know (see Brans et al., 2013). In 
addition, we asked participants to view negative images in the scanner but did 
not ask them to indicate decisions to regulate until the subsequent choice task. 
Future work could study choices made in the scanner in order to contrast the 
brain mechanisms of explicit choices with those reflecting spontaneous 
recruitment of emotion generation and regulation processes predicting later 
choices identified here.  
Finally, it’s possible that brain mechanisms of regulation decisions 
meaningfully differ across participant populations, like older adults (see Winecoff 
et al., 2011; Urry and Gross, 2010), or children and adolescents (Martin & 
Ochsner, 2016). Regulation decisions may also relate to subclinical variability in 
brain structure variables, like integrity of white matter tracts connecting brain 





or psychological variables like the motivation to experience particular emotional 
states (Tamir et al., 2015). 
Conclusion 
When faced with emotional challenges, what determines whether we let 
our emotions unfold or attempt to rein them in? Here we suggest that, when 
confronted with distressing stimuli, 1) greater responses in brain regions 
associated with emotional reactivity and cognitive control can be used to identify 
people who are more likely to regulate their emotional responses, and 2) 
expression of a brain pattern associated with cognitively regulating emotion can 
be used to predict whether regulation is chosen for a given stimulus. We hope 
that future work will build on the findings we describe here to work toward a 
mechanistic and prospectively predictive science of variable behavioral 







Chapter 4: Reappraisal causes lasting changes in the content and 
emotional impact of negative autobiographical memories 
 
Introduction 
How we remember our emotional past can have a lasting impact on how 
we live our lives going forward. Consider high school seniors who receive 
rejection letters from their dream schools. For some, how they respond to the 
challenge of such a letter could shape their life trajectory in a profound way. For 
perhaps more, an emotionally impactful memory of the experience will persist 
through the college years and beyond. Recollecting this rejection with the goal of 
changing negative feelings could durably change its representation in memory 
and set the stage for future adaptive behavior. For example, one could minimize 
the importance of the rejection (it was just one school of many, the campus 
culture is perhaps a poor fit anyway, etc.), or one could construe the event in a 
way that enhances positive feelings by highlighting the potential upside (this was 
an opportunity to stay closer to family, to take time to travel, etc.).  In either case, 
how well one regulates the emotions elicited by an unpleasant event could 
change the way that is represented and recalled later, and as such, could impact 
the way it influences future choices. 
Of course, emotion regulation has relevance outside college rejection 
letters. Indeed, a rich literature demonstrates correlations between self-reported 
emotion regulation frequency and a variety of beneficial life outcomes (DeSteno, 
Gross, & Kubzansky, 2013; Gross & Munoz, 1995). Unfortunately, however, 





emotional responses in the moments an event is occurring, little is known about 
whether using reappraisal to cognitively transform the meaning of an emotional 
experience can lead to lasting changes in its representation in memory, or how 
such changes might come about (see Denny et al, 2015). 
Theories of reconstructive memory imply that durable, regulation-induced 
changes in the mental representation of a memory should be possible. Retrieval 
of autobiographical episodes, even those remembered with high confidence, is 
not consistent over multiple retellings (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). Even memory for emotional experiences, typically 
experienced as highly vivid and psychologically immediate (see Rubin, 2005; 
Nigro & Neisser, 1983), can show biases, including recollecting one’s past 
feelings as being more consistent with one’s current feelings than they actually 
were (Levine & Safer, 2002; Safer, Bonnano, & Field, 2001). Such inaccuracies 
are consistent with the principle that emotional memory is reconstructed based 
on current goals and information, rather than reproduced with high fidelity from 
the original experience (Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009; Levine & Safer, 2002; 
Ochsner & Schacter, 2000).  Moreover, new information introduced during 
retrieval can be incorporated into the memory representation and reproduced in 
subsequent retrievals (Loftus, 1979; Koriat, Goldsmith, Pansky, 2000; Ochsner, 
Schacter, & Edwards, 1997). Strikingly, such post-event information is recalled, 
in some cases, with as much confidence as information actually presented at 
encoding, suggesting that memory has been biased toward the new information 





If – as was reviewed above – objectively false details provided by an 
external influence (e.g., an experimenter) can be incorporated into and 
recollected as part of the original memory, then information that is self-introduced 
via reappraisal (which could be true, false, or inherently uncertain) might change 
memory representations in an analogous way. A handful of recent studies have 
shown results consistent with this hypothesis. For instance, in a recent 
observational study, students who reported using reappraisal to cope with an 
upcoming exam later remembered their pre-exam emotions as less negative and 
more positive (Levine et al., 2012). In another study, participants who expected 
to meet a happy confederate used fewer negative emotion words when 
describing one of their memories (Holland, Tamir, & Kensinger, 2010). That said, 
these studies have not directly manipulated whether and how participants 
reappraised, collected data diagnostic of how successfully reappraisal was 
implemented, or showed sustained changes in these memories over time.  
With these considerations in mind, we conducted an experiment that used 
a longitudinal approach to address questions about the impact of reappraisal on 
memories for emotional events. The first and most general question was whether 
reappraisal can evoke durable change in the content and emotional impact of 
negative memories. This question was motivated by the preceding literature 
review, which showed that reappraisal could attenuate one’s current negative 
emotional response to an event by re-working one’s current mental 
representation of it. Here we predicted that to the extent these changes in mental 





consistent with they way in which it was reappraised – rather than how it was 
initially described before reappraising – and the associated attenuation of one’s 
negative emotional response to the event should be long-lasting. Such findings 
would be consistent with the idea that reappraisal leads to the reconstruction of 
negative memories (Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Levine et al., 2012). 
A second question concerned the variables that determine the durability of 
reappraisal’s effects. On one hand, it seems straightforward to predict that to the 
extent reappraisal is initially successful in diminishing negative emotion, then its 
effects on memory for an event’s content as well as one’s emotion reactions to it, 
should last longer (see Silvers et al., 2014). On the other hand, the way in which 
one reappraises could also play a key role. This possibility was foreshadowed by 
the distinction between positive and minimizing reappraisals of college rejection 
described in our introductory example. This distinction has been the focus of 
recent studies contrasting these different reappraisal tactics. Positive reappraisal 
aims to enhance positive feelings by elaborating potential positive meanings for 
an event whereas minimizing reappraisals aim to diminish negative feelings by 
minimizing the importance of an event or its anticipated consequences (Shiota & 
Levenson, 2009; McRae et al., 2012).  According to current theories, positive 
reappraisal success depends on bringing to mind new positive emotional content 
(e.g., potential opportunities for growth or other beneficial outcomes) and 
incorporating this content into the representation of an experience (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). This leads to the novel 





degree to which new positive content is incorporated during the reappraisal 
process. That said, the beneficial effects of reappraisal also have been theorized 
to depend on the ability to adopt a psychologically distant perspective when 
considering an emotional experience (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2010). Following from 
this idea, the lasting impact of a minimizing reappraisal could depend in part on 
how much it increases the experience of psychological distance.   
Method 
Overview 
We aimed to test whether positive and minimizing reappraisal can evoke 
durable changes in negative autobiographical memories and to identify 
mechanisms bringing about these changes. This experiment used a three-
session design. In the first (baseline) session, participants recalled and wrote out 
the content of negative autobiographical memories. In the second (experimental) 
session, they either recalled (for the control group) or reappraised these 
memories, again writing out their content. Ratings of experience and 
measurements of word use from this second session allowed us to quantify the 
immediate effects of reappraisal. In a final (durability) session one week later, 
participants were prompted to recall and write about the memories again – data 
from this session allowed us to quantify the lasting effects of reappraisal. Finally, 
to identify tactic-specific and tactic-general mechanisms of lasting change 
caused by reappraisal, we quantified relationships between affect ratings and 





session. All study procedures were approved by the Columbia University 
Institutional Review Board. 
Participants and design 
Participants (who completed the full study) were 117 US adults (70F; 
mean age = 34.1, SD = 9.9) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
crowdsourcing platform, who indicated that English was their first language. We 
used a 3 (study day: 1, 2, 9) by 3 (experimental group: minimizing reappraisal, 
positive reappraisal, control) mixed design with study day as a within-participants 
factor and experimental group as a between-participants factor. Based on prior 
studies of the reappraisal of autobiographical memories (e.g., Holland, Tamir & 
Kensinger, 2010), a sample size of at least 30 participants per group was 
decided in advance; anticipating high rates of attrition, 180 participants were 
initially recruited. 
Procedure 
Study Day 1: Baseline. Participants (180) consented to take part in a 9-
day study of personal memories, and were paid $1.50 to complete a 20 min 
survey administered via Qualtrics. In this survey, for three separate memories, 
participants were asked to think of a specific experience (i.e. one that happened 
at a particular place and time and lasted less than 24 hours) from the past year 
that made them feel negative emotions.   
Next, participants provided a 3 to 6 word phrase that could be used to cue 
them to think about this experience, and then spent 3 minutes continuously 





timed page that automatically advanced after 3 minutes and 10 seconds). 
Participants then used sliding bar scales to indicate (after having recollected and 
written about the memory) current negative feelings (0:not at all to 
100:extremely), current positive feelings (0:not at all to 100:extremely), how 
vividly they experienced the memory (0:not at all to 100:extremely), and how 
psychologically distant the event appeared to them in their recollection (0: very 
close to 100: very far).  
 
 Figure 4.1 Experimental design. Participants recalled three memories on 
study day 1, used positive reappraisal, minimizing reappraisal, or again 
recalled these three memories on day 2, and then recalled the three 
memories on study day 9. At all time points, participants typed their thoughts 
about the remembered experience – that is, they typed out everything that 
came to mind when recalling the memory.  
 
Study Day 2: Reappraisal. Participants who fully completed and 
submitted the day 1 survey were awarded an MTurk qualification to enable them 
to complete the day 2 Qualtrics survey and were sent a notification message with 
information about accessing the survey (which took 25 min and paid $2.00), and 





participants did not complete the day 2 survey within 48 hours and were deemed 
ineligible to continue (i.e. were lost to day 2 follow-up). Within the day 2 survey, 
participants were randomly assigned to the positive reappraisal group, 
minimizing reappraisal group, or control group.  
Participants assigned to the positive reappraisal and minimizing 
reappraisal groups were walked through an automated (positive or minimizing) 
reappraisal training procedure that explained the concept of reappraisal, gave 
specific examples of reappraisals for an example event, asked participants to 
reflect on times in their life where they might have used reappraisal, and 
instructed them that they would be asked to reappraise their memories in this 
survey. To test attentiveness and understanding, participants in these groups 
were asked to type a paraphrase of the reappraisal instructions (the survey did 
not allow participants to press the browser “back” button to review the 
instructions). Next, for each of the three memories they reported on in the day 1 
survey, participants were asked to spend 3 minutes reappraising the experience 
and typing out the contents of this reappraisal as it came to mind. In the positive 
reappraisal group, instructions read: “For the next 3 minutes, try to positivize or 
enhance your positive feelings about [memory cue] by thinking about positive 
things that have come about or could come about because of this event. Don’t 
worry about editing your response – just type out your thoughts about [memory 
cue] as they come to mind”. In the minimizing reappraisal group, instructions 
read, “For the next 3 minutes, try to minimize or dampen your feelings about 





come about because of this event. Don’t worry about editing your response – just 
type out your thoughts about [memory cue] as they come to mind”.  
In the control group, participants received no reappraisal training or 
instruction – instead they were told that they would be asked to think and write 
about their memories again. They were also asked to paraphrase these 
instructions (with no opportunity to press the browser back button). In the control 
group, instructions for each memory read: “For the next 3 minutes, type 
everything that comes to mind when you think about [memory cue]. Don’t worry 
about editing your response – just type out your thoughts about [memory cue] as 
they come to mind”. In all three groups, after writing about each memory, 
participants made the same ratings as in the day 1 survey: current negative 
feelings, current positive feelings, memory vividness, and psychological distance.  
Study Day 9: Week-delayed durability. Seven days after day 2, 
participants who fully completed and submitted the day 2 survey were awarded 
an MTurk qualification to enable them to complete the day 9 Qualtrics survey and 
were sent a notification message with information about accessing the survey 
(which took 20 min and paid $4.00), and a reminder email if they had not 
completed the survey after 24 hours. Nine participants did not complete this 
survey (i.e., were lost to day 9 follow-up).  
Within the day 9 survey, participants in all three groups completed a 
procedure that was similar to the day 2 procedure for the control group. That is, 
participants were instructed that they would be asked to think and write about the 





this instructions, and were then asked, for each of their three memory cues, to 
spend 3 minutes (timed) typing everything that comes to mind when they think 
about that experience, and then to provide ratings of current negative affect, 
positive affect, memory vividness, and psychological distance.  
Analyses 
Because our questions consider group- and individual-level differences in 
emotion and cognition, we averaged across the three memories each participant 
wrote about before analyzing the data. In order to address Hypothesis 1 – that 
reappraisal can cause lasting change in affect ratings and word use, we 
quantified group-level effects using the R packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) to 
implement mixed effects models. These models tested categorical effects of 
study day (1, 2, and 9) and experimental group (positive reappraisal, minimizing 
reappraisal, and control) on self-report ratings and memory text word use, 
including random effects terms to allow model coefficients (intercepts and slopes) 
to vary by participant, and using the Kenward-Roger approximation to compute 
degrees of freedom (see Kenward & Roger, 1997). When considering change 
from day 1 to day 9, we used a regressed change approach by including day 1 
ratings as a covariate (see Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Allison, 1990).  
To quantify word use, we processed texts with the Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC) tool, a lexicon and software package that computes 
frequencies of words reflective of particular psychological states (Pennebaker et 
al., 2007). We focused on four classes of LIWC content of a priori interest: 1) 





posemo (positive emotion) words, which reflect expression of positive affect, 3) 
first-person singular pronouns, which indicate self-reference and are thought to 
relate to psychological distance effects on emotion (reviewed in Pennebaker & 
Chung, 2007), and 4) a psychological-distance composite variable (see 
Pennebaker & King, 1999; Cohn et al., 2004) that combines positive scores for 
frequencies of LIWC articles and words of more than six letters with negative 
scores for first-person pronouns, present-tense verbs, and reality-discrepancy 
words, and which has been suggested to capture global differences in language 
that reflect expression of psychological immediacy versus distance.  
Reported beta coefficients (with 95% CI) are unstandardized, indicating 
raw effect sizes (on 0-100 scales for self-report variables, -100 to +100 scales for 
self-report change scores, and on 0%-100% scales for word use variables).  
Results 
Manipulation check. To check attention to and understanding of the 
instructions, a rater (aware of group) checked and coded the participant-provided 
paraphrases of the instructions given on study day 2 (1 = conveys understanding, 
0 = does not convey understanding); 5 participants were removed from the 
analysis stream because their paraphrases suggested that they had not 
understood (or paid attention to) the instructions. To check that the memory texts 
were composed in accordance with instructions, a rater blind to group coded a 
random sample of 100 of the day 2 memory texts (68 reappraisal group texts and 
32 recall group texts) for whether they reflected an attempt to reappraise a 





content). Of the 68 texts composed under reappraisal conditions 67 were coded 
as including reappraisal content; of the 32 recall texts, 4 were coded as including 
reappraisal content These data suggest that our participants had understood and 
followed the instructions they were given.  
Hypothesis 1: Reappraisal causes immediate and lasting change in affect 
and word use 
Effects on negative and positive affect. Consistent with the hypothesis 
that reappraisal evokes both immediate and long-lasting change in emotional 
experience, we found an interaction of study day and experimental group, F(2, 
114) = 172.1, p<.0001, such that lower negative affect on day 2 was reported in 
the positive reappraisal group, b = -30.2, 95%CI [-38.7, -21.7], and minimizing 
reappraisal group, b = -31.9, 95%CI [-40.5, -23.4], relative to the control group 
(who did not reappraise), and this effect was partially sustained at a week delay 
(when all groups recalled) in that lower negative affect on day 9 was reported by 
participants in the positive reappraisal group, b = -15.8, 95%CI [-24.6, -6.9], and 
the minimizing reappraisal group, b =  -17.0, 95%CI [-25.7, -8.3], relative to the 
control group (see Figure 4.2). There was no significant difference between the 






Figure 4.2. Effects of study day and experimental group on ratings of negative 
affect, positive affect, memory vividness, and psychological distance when 
recalling and typing the content of negative autobiographical memories.  
 
or day 9 (CIs substantially overlapped zero), suggesting that the two reappraisal 
tactics initially and durably decreased negative affect to a comparable extent 
(see Figure 4.2, first panel).  
Turning to positive affect, we found an interaction of study day and 
experimental group, F(2, 114) = 34.7, p<.0001, such that higher positive affect on 
day 2 was reported in the positive reappraisal group, b = 35.3, 95%CI [26.6, 
44.0], and minimizing reappraisal group, b = 22.6, 95%CI [13.9, 31.4], relative to 
the control group (who did not reappraise), and this effect was partially sustained 
at a week delay (when all groups recalled) in that higher positive affect on day 9 
was reported by participants in the positive reappraisal group, b = 18.2, 95%CI  
[9.2, 27.3], and (directionally) for the minimizing reappraisal group, b = 6.8, 
95%CI [-2.0, 15.7], relative to the control group (see Figure 4.2). Additionally, 
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positive reappraisal group reported significantly higher positive affect than the 
minimizing reappraisal group at day 2, b = 12.7, 95%CI [3.9, 21.4], and at day 9, 
b = 11.4, 95%CI = [2.5, 20.3], indicating that positive reappraisal initially and 
durably increased positive affect to a greater extent than minimizing reappraisal. 
Effects on psychological distance and memory vividness. Consistent 
with the hypothesis that minimizing reappraisal evokes changes in psychological 
distance, we found an interaction of study day and experimental group, F(2, 114) 
= 4.9, p<.01, such that participants in the minimizing reappraisal group reported 
greater psychological distance than participants in the control group at day 2, b = 
16.3, 95%CI [8.5, 24.2], and day 9, b = 11.7, 95%CI [3.8, 19.7] (see Figure 4.2). 
For day 9, there was a directional difference in psychological distance ratings 
between the minimizing reappraisal group and the positive reappraisal group, b = 
6.7, 95%CI [-1.3, 14.7], suggesting that long-term levels of psychological 
distance may be highest for minimizing reappraisal. Similarly, for memory 
vividness ratings we found a significant day by group interaction, F(2, 114) = 5.1, 
p<.01, such that, at day 2, vividness ratings were lower in the minimizing group 
than in the control group, b = -12.1, 95%CI [-19.3, -5.0], and the positive 






Figure 4.3 Effects of study day and experimental group on use of negative emotion 
words, positive emotion words, first-person singular pronouns, and psychological 
distance words when recalling and typing the content of negative autobiographical 
memories in Study 3. Example words in context are paraphrased from memory 
texts selected at random.  
 
 Effects on negative and positive emotion words. Consistent with the 
prediction that positive and minimizing reappraisal can change the linguistic 
content of negative autobiographical memories, we found an interaction of day 
and group, F (2, 114) = 3.4, p=.04, such that, at day 2 (when reappraising), both 
the positive, b = -1.1, 95%CI [-1.7, -0.6], and minimizing reappraisal groups, b = -
0.6, 95%CI [-1.2, 0.0, used fewer negative emotion words (as a percentage of 
total words) than the control group. However, at day 9 (when instructed to recall 
memories), the positive reappraisal group used significantly fewer negative 
emotion words than the control group, b = -1.2, 95%CI [-1.8,-0.6], but the 





changes in negative emotion words were sustained only for positive reappraisal 
(see Figure 4.3).  
Similarly, for positive linguistic content, we found an interaction, F = (2, 
114) = 11.7, p<.0001, such that, at day 2, both the positive reappraisal, b = 2.2, 
95%CI [1.7, 2.7],  and minimizing reappraisal groups, b = 1.1, 95%CI [0.5, 1.6], 
used more positive emotion words (as a percentage of total words) than the 
control group. As hypothesized, at day 9, the positive reappraisal group used (at 
trend-level) more positive emotion words than the control group, b=0.6, 95%CI = 
[0.1, 1.2], but the minimizing reappraisal group did not, b= -0.2, 95%CI [-0.8, 0.3], 
p=.20, suggesting that changes in positive emotion words may have been 
durably sustained for positive reappraisal (see Figure 4.3).  
 Effects on first-person singular pronouns and psychological 
distance words. Turning to first-person pronouns, we found a trend-level 
interaction of day and group, F(2, 114) = 2.4, p=.09, such that, at day 2, the 
minimizing reappraisal group used fewer first-person singular pronouns (as a 
percentage of total words) than the control group, b=-1.8, 95%CI [-2.8, -0.7], and 
the positive reappraisal group, b=-1.3, 95%CI [-2.4, -0.2]. However, no such 
effect was apparent at day 9 (see Figure 4.3, third panel). For values of the 
psychological distance composite variable, we found a main effect of study day, 
F = (2, 114) = 8.5, p<.0005, indicating that global use of psychological distance 
words decreased over time, but no day by group interaction, F = (2,114) = 1.0, 
p=.37, indicating that the overall time-course of change in distance words was 





Hypothesis 2: Positive and minimizing reappraisal bring about memory 
change via tactic-general and tactic-specific mechanisms 
Mechanisms of lasting change in negative affect. To test in-the-
moment reappraisal success as a tactic-general mechanism of durability, we 
asked whether change in negative affect from day 1 to day 9 (which for the 
reappraisal groups reflects reappraisal durability) could be prospectively 
predicted by negative affect ratings collected at day 2 (which for the reappraisal 
groups reflects in-the-moment reappraisal success). We found a main effect 
(collapsing across groups) such that day 2 negative affect predicted the change 
in negative affect from day 1 to day 9, b=0.51, 95%CI [0.40, 0.72] (see Figure 
4.4A, first panel). 
To test reappraisal-associated increase in psychological distance as a tactic-
specific mechanism of durability for minimizing reappraisal, we asked whether 
day 1 to day 9 negative affect change is predicted by psychological distance on 
day 2 (controlling for psychological distance on day 1). We found a significant 
relationship in the minimizing reappraisal group, b=-0.3, 95%CI [-0.6, -0.1], 
p<.01, but not in the positive reappraisal group, b=0.3, 95%CI [-0.1, 0.7], p=.19, 








Figure 4.4 Factors predicting A) lasting change in negative affect, B) 
lasting change in positive affect , and C) lasting change in psychological 
distance experienced when recalling and typing the content of negative 






Mechanisms of lasting change in positive affect. To test immediate 
success in up-regulating positive affect as a tactic-general mechanism of 
durability, we asked whether change in positive affect from day 1 to day 9 (which 
for the reappraisal groups in part reflects reappraisal durability) is prospectively 
predicted by positive affect at day 2 (which for the reappraisal groups in part 
reflects immediate reappraisal success). As expected, we found a main effect 
(collapsing across groups) such that day 2 positive affect predicts the change in 
positive affect from day 1 to day 9, b=0.51, 95%CI [0.40, 0.62] (see Figure 4.4B, 
first panel); this relationship was apparent in the minimizing reappraisal group, 
b=0.5, 95%CI [0.23, 0.77, the positive reappraisal group, b=0.32 ,95%CI [0.01, 
0.63], and the control group, b=0.76, 95%CI [0.21, 1.31].   
Further, to test addition of positive content as a tactic-specific mechanism 
of durability for positive reappraisal, we asked whether day 1 to day 9 positive 
affect change was predicted by number of positive emotion words used at time 2. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, we found a relationship in the positive 
reappraisal group, b=3.5, 95%CI [0.4, 6.6], but not in the minimizing reappraisal 
group, b= -2.6, 95%CI [-5.1, 0.8] (see Figure 4.4B, second panel). However, we 
did find evidence for this relationship in the control group, b=2.9, 95%CI [0.2, 
5.6]. To control for overall word use, we ran models that included number of 
positive emotion words and total overall word count as simultaneous predictors of 
day 1 to day 9 positive affect change. Controlling for total word count, the 
relationship between positive emotion words and positive affect change held for 





b=2.1, 95%CI [-1.0, 5.3], suggesting that, for positive reappraisal, use of positive 
words predicts durably increased positive affect independent of overall word use.  
Mechanisms of lasting change in psychological distance. Because 
group-level analyses revealed lasting change in psychological distance for the 
minimizing reappraisal group (see Figure 4.2A, fourth panel), we conducted 
follow-up analyses investigating mechanisms of this durability. By analogy to the 
tactic-general mechanisms of affective durability identified above (ratings of 
positive and negative affect at day 2), we hypothesized that day 2 psychological 
distance ratings would prospectively predict day 1 to day 9 change in 
psychological distance. As expected, we found a main effect (collapsing across 
groups) such that day 2 distance predicted the change in distance from day 1 to 
day 9, b=0.64, 95%CI [0.29, 0.98], (see Figure 4.4C, first panel); this relationship 
was apparent in the minimizing reappraisal group, b=0.54, 95%CI [0.08, 0.94], 
the positive reappraisal group, b=0.77, 95%CI [0.33, 1.21], and directionally in 
the control group, b=0.46, 95%CI [-0.18, 1.10].  
By analogy to the specific mechanisms of durability tested above, we 
asked whether word use at day 2 could predict the lasting increase in 
psychological distance seen in the minimizing group. We did not find a 
relationship between first-person singular pronouns and day 1 and day 9 change 
in psychological distance for the minimizing, positive reappraisal or control 
groups (all CIs substantially overlapped zero). Turning to psychological distance 
words, we found that, for minimizing reappraisal, distance words used at day 2 





95%CI [0.6, 2.9], (see Figure 4.4C, second panel). We did not find this 
relationship in the positive reappraisal or control groups (CIs substantially 
overlapped zero). 
Discussion 
We began by asking whether reappraising a memory of a recent negative 
experience, like receiving a rejection letter, can durably change the content and 
affective impact of that memory. Consistent with theories of reconstructive 
memory, we found that both positive and minimizing reappraisal lead to durable 
change in such memories, and that they do so via mechanisms both overlapping 
(i.e., the immediate success with which reappraisal was implemented) and 
distinct (i.e., an addition of positive content for positive reappraisal versus an 
increase in psychological distance for minimizing reappraisal).  
Notably, some overlapping, tactic-general mechanisms of affective 
durability were also apparent for participants who did not reappraise (i.e., those 
in the control group). For example, regardless of having reappraised or simply 
recalled, how participants felt about their memories on the second day of the 
study predicted the change in their feelings from the beginning to the end of the 
study. This pattern converges with prior literature on reconstruction of memory 
for emotion (Levine, 2009). Because reappraisal leads to immediate changes in 
feelings, the pattern suggests reconstruction of memory for emotion as a general 
mechanism of affective stability that can be exploited by the reappraisal process.  
We also found evidence for a nuanced pattern of specific mechanisms 





reappraisal. Consistent with theorizing in this area (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000; 
Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Ayduk & Kross, 2010), lasting affective change was 
prospectively predicted, for positive reappraisal, by reappraisal-associated use of 
positive emotion words, and, for minimizing reappraisal, by reappraisal-
associated increases in psychological distance. Moreover, lasting change in the 
emotional content of memory descriptions was evident for positive reappraisal, 
which durably decreased use of negative emotion words and increased use of 
positive emotion words, but not for minimizing reappraisal, which showed long-
term emotional word use comparable to control conditions. Broadly, these 
findings suggests that positive and minimizing reappraisal evoke long-term 
change in fundamentally different ways – positive reappraisal entails imbuing 
memories with a “silver lining” via the sustained addition of new positively 
valenced information whereas minimizing reappraisal entails psychologically 
“taking a step back” from the events of a memory in order to decouple one’s 
emotional response from the (comparatively) unchanged affective memory 
content. Lastly, we also observed long-term changes in psychological distance 
elicited by minimizing reappraisal, which was especially pronounced for 
participants who used more psychologically distant language and showed greater 
immediate increases in psychological distance when reappraising. 
Reappraisal, expressive writing, and reconstructive memory  
The fact that some memory effects also were apparent directionally or at 
trend-level for participants in the control group prompts the hypothesis that 





instructed to reappraise – future studies with observational designs and larger 
sample sizes could target this issue directly. Related, this work connects to 
research in the expressive writing tradition, which asks participants to write about 
trauma in a relatively non-directed way, in that we observed psychological 
benefits as a result of writing about negative personal experiences. This writing 
literature has focused on word use (as a process variable), and global physical 
and psychological health (as outcome variables). It has been suggested that 
spontaneous processes analogous to reappraisal, reflected in word use, may 
underlie global benefits brought about by the expressive writing paradigm 
(Pennebaker & Ferrell, 2013; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). Future research 
could ask how much similarity these spontaneous processes show to instructed 
positive and minimizing reappraisal, how such processes may change 
representations and emotional impact of memories for particular events, and how 
these event-level changes may accrete into global changes in health.  
Implications for the study of emotion regulation in the laboratory 
Compared to standard laboratory approaches to understanding emotion 
regulation, this study differed in that participants were asked to apply reappraisal 
to personally meaningful experiences, were given more time to produce each 
reappraisal, and were asked to articulate and report on their reappraisals in a 
more explicit and effortful manner. Importantly, any of these factors could be 
relevant for durability. For example, a personal memory is more likely to be re-
experienced in the future than a normatively aversive image – this design feature 





attempt to estimate independent effects of each of these factors to deepen our 
understanding of when durability does and does not emerge.  
Additionally, prior work has made little attempt to measure the content that 
is brought to mind during reappraisal (but see McRae et al., 2012), or ask what 
becomes of this content. As we show, the initial degree and longer-term fate of 
valenced content introduced by reappraisal is different for positive versus 
minimizing reappraisal, and the amount of positive content introduced has 
implications for whether the effects of positive reappraisal take hold in a lasting 
way. In general, measurement of reappraisal content may provide deeper insight 
into the psychological mechanisms that bring about immediate and long-term 
success in changing feelings. 
Implications for emotion regulation in clinical contexts 
 The present work may also have relevance for understanding dysfunction 
in emotion regulation processes. It is increasingly appreciated that emotional 
disorders differ with respect to problems regulating positive versus negative 
emotion (e.g., Carl et al., 2013); future work could ask whether particular 
disorders show disproportionate impairment in or greater potential for benefit 
from positive versus minimizing reappraisal. Moreover, the methods we apply 
here could help uncover mechanisms of regulatory impairment by asking what 
steps of the regulatory process are most affected for particular disorders. 
Patients with depression, for example, could have difficulty with any of: 1) the 
initial generation of positive reappraisal information/content, 2) the ability to use 





information/content in memory representations over time, or 4) the persistence of 
affective change. Although some of these questions have received attention 
(e.g., Erk et al., 2010), previous methods of experimentally assessing emotion 
regulation do not cleanly disentangle them.  
Limitations & Future Directions 
There are limitations of this work worth considering, which may provide 
direction for future research. First, we used a between-group manipulation of 
reappraisal, which makes it likely that our participants showed explicit memory 
for the strategy they applied on day 2, and it is possible that they may have re-
evoked this strategy in a top-down manner on day 9. Our understanding of these 
processes could be enhanced with studies incorporating within-subject 
manipulation of reappraisal, manipulation of explicit memory for strategy, and 
brain data diagnostic of top-down re-evocation of reappraisal versus bottom-up 
change in affective response (see Denny et al., 2015). On another point, the 
intervening time between study sessions allowed for additional rehearsal of 
memory and reappraisal content, which may have contributed to the magnitude 
of observed durability. Studies incorporating ecological assessment of memory- 
and reappraisal-related thought in daily life could measure such rehearsal and 
directly quantify its impact.  
There are also theoretical questions worth pursuing further. For one, we 
found that positive reappraisal entails adding positive content, and minimizing 
reappraisal entails changing perspective, but there may be ways that minimizing 





methods we applied. For example, minimizing reappraisal may involve adding 
idiosyncratic kinds of content for different memories or altering the context in 
which emotional words occur. Another important question concerns the temporal 
trajectory of affective change. We show durable effects of reappraisal at one 
week: it will be important to test the boundaries of this effect by measuring affect 
more densely and for longer time periods. Finally, our work doesn’t address the 
role of motivation in reappraisal-induced memory bias. That is, participants may 
typically be motivated to regulate their emotion in a hedonic direction, and this 
may contribute to the durability evident in the reappraisal groups (see Mauss & 
Tamir, 2014). Given a pronounced shift in retrieval goals, would participants be 
able to recall their initial feelings and memory content more accurately (see 
Anderson & Pichert, 1978)? Addressing these questions would build our 
understanding of reconstructive memory for emotional events and clarify roles of 
content accessibility versus relevance in producing lasting change.   
Conclusion 
When we strive for a silver lining, or attempt to take a step back from 
memories of difficulty, what determines whether our new approach will take hold 
and result in lasting changes in our records of the past and our reactions to 
them? Here we leverage theory and methods from the study of emotion 
regulation, expressive writing, and reconstructive memory to address this 
question. We find that positive reappraisal, to the extent that it introduces new 
positive content, and minimizing reappraisal, to the extent that it widens one's 





We hope that future work on the temporal dynamics of memory content and 
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